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Using unique, representative data on domestic violence, we document several stylized
facts on abuse: the average characteristics of abused wives and abusive husbands are
markedly diﬀerent than the characteristics of individuals in non-violent marriages, the
vast majority of violent marriages end in divorce, and employment rates are lower for
women who experience abuse. We then construct a sequential model of employment,
marriage and abuse. The results indicate abuse is the primary factor in the decision to
divorce and witnessing violence as a child is a strong predictor of becoming an abusive
spouse. Policy experiments suggest men are more responsive to policies designed to
increase the costs of abuse than women are to policies reducing the cost of leaving violent
marriages and policies designed to reduce the inter-generational eﬀects of domestic
violence may be promising strategies for preventing abuse.
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Domestic abuse1 is a social issue of concern to individuals and policy makers alike. The
magnitude of the problem may be surprising: estimates from the Canadian Violence Against
Women Survey (VAWS) indicate that 29% of ever-married Canadian women (Statistics
Canada, 1993a, p.4) and 50% of divorced women have been victims of abuse.2 Despite the
prevalence of domestic violence, the private nature of this phenomena and the resulting
unavailability of data made abuse a diﬃcult subject to study. However, surveys detailing
the incidence of domestic violence have recently emerged and a series of studies concerning
the economic implications of abuse has followed.
Tauchen, Witte and Long (1991) were the ﬁrst to model domestic violence within an
economic framework. In their model, husbands maximize utility by choosing the amount of
abuse and income to tranfer to their wives, subject to the wives’ reservation utility levels.
This framework has been applied to several data sets to estimate the number of incidents
of violence in abusive marriages (Tauchen, Witte and Long, 1991; Farmer and Tiefenthaler,
1997; Kingston-Riechers, 1997). The papers in this literature, while providing an important
ﬁrst step in our understanding of domestic violence, tended to rely on small, select samples
of currently married and abused women or samples of women who contacted the police.
These data likely exclude women who left abusive relationships after learning their spouse’s
behavior, and may therefore present an inaccurate portrayal of the prevalence of abuse.
Others in the literature have studied the eﬀects of abuse on employment (Lloyd 1997a,
1997b) and the relationship between abuse and divorce (Kingston-Riechers, 2001). While
these studies point out important potential eﬀects of abuse, they ignore the selection into
marriage and the relationship between employment and marital status decisions. Domestic
1The expressions domestic abuse and domestic violence shall be used interchangeably in this paper.
2The VAWS deﬁnes domestic violence as including any of the following activites: threatening to hit,
pushing, grabbing, shoving, slapping, kicking, hitting, biting, beating, choking, threatening to use or using
a gun or knife or sexual assault.
2violence is also often treated as an exogenous determinant of behavior. These issues all
likely have important consequences for any inference regarding domestic violence.
In this paper we address these shortcomings and make two important contributions
to the existing literature on domestic abuse. First, we document several stylized facts
on domestic violence using the 1993 VAWS. The VAWS, which contains a large, random
sample of women, is one of the most representative data sets currently available on domestic
violence.3 One particularly valuable feature of the data is information on the presence of
violence in the family of origin for women and for current and past spouses. This background
variable is not only a strong predictor of domestic abuse, but is important for modelling
as it is exogenous to the individual. The data highlight three noteworthy aspects of abuse:
(1) the average characteristics of abused wives and abusive husbands are markedly diﬀerent
from their counterparts in non-violent marriages, (2) the majority of violent marriages end
in divorce, and (3) the employment rate of abused women, regardless of current marital
status, is lower than that for non-abused women.
Second, we construct and estimate a model that is able to account for the empirical
regularities observed in the data. Similar to Tauchen, Witte and Long (1991), domestic
violence serves two roles for men within the model. Men may have preferences over abuse
directly and may also use abuse as a mechanism through which to inﬂuence their wives’
behavior, in particular her employment decision. To capture the relationship between do-
mestic violence and divorce, men and women make decisions sequentially in the model.
That is, women make employment decisions taking into account how their behavior inﬂu-
ences the likelihood of experiencing abuse in the future and men decide whether to abuse
taking into account the likelihood their wives will divorce them. We also incorporate het-
3Several studies outside the economic literature have studied these data extensively. For example, Thomp-
son, Saltzman and Johnson (2001) and Ratner (1998) document the determinants of suﬀering injury from
physical abuse in the VAWS and the health eﬀects of abuse, respectively. Wilson, Johnson and Daly (1995)
consider the demographic correlates of domestic violence.
3erogeneity in characteristics that determine the female’s tolerance for abuse and the male’s
predilection for violence in the model to reﬂect the heterogeneity evident in the samples
of abusive and non-abusive relationships. To estimate the model, we use data from the
VAWS on initial marriage formations, domestic violence experienced by women in current
and past relationships, violence in the family backgrounds of women and their spouses and
the female’s current employment behavior.
The results of our analysis reveal the following ﬁndings. First, domestic violence is an
important factor in divorce decisions: women who are abused are signiﬁcantly more likely
to divorce than women in non-violent marriages. What is more important in explaining
the high divorce rates among abused women, however, is the strong correlation between
the individual characteristics of women who are abused and those of women who divorce.
Second, for men observing domestic violence as a child, the likelihood of abusing one’s
own wife increases by 348%. This highlights the importance of inter-generational eﬀects
of domestic violence. Third, the lower employment rates of abused women observed in
the raw data are attributed to diﬀerences in exogenous characteristics, as we ﬁnd abuse
does not have a direct causal eﬀect on the current employment decisions of married women
and the employment decisions of women do not have a signiﬁcant impact on the husband’s
decision to abuse. Finally, results from policy experiments highlight the potential of policies
aimed at reducing the inter-generational eﬀects of violence and imposing separation costs
on abusive spouses to reduce domestic violence rates.
2 The Violence Against Women Survey
The VAWS was conducted between February and June of 1993 and involved telephone
interviews of 12,300 women aged 18 and above in all provinces of Canada. The survey
dealt with the respondents’ experiences of violence since the age of 16 as well as their
4perception of personal safety. The VAWS is particularly valuable in three respects. First, it
contains a random sample of women. This is in contrast to most surveys involving abuse-
related subject matter, where samples tend to be limited to abused women seeking services
(Tauchen, Witte and Long, 1991; Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997) or to low income families
in a restricted geographical area (Lloyd, 1997a, 1997b). In this paper, we focus our analysis
on domestic violence in past and current marriages and common-law relationships.
Second, survey responses were not restricted to reported incidents alone: all activities
considered an oﬀense under the Canadian Criminal code, reported or not, were recorded. As
a result, the problem of underestimating the prevalence of violence by restricting responses
to reported incidents is mitigated to some extent. However, considering the highly sensitive
nature of the survey questions, the data may still be subject to some degree of under-
reporting. It is likely that all women do not fully disclose their experiences regarding
domestic abuse to the interviewer out of fear, shame or denial (Okun, 1986; Weis, 1989;
Straus and Gelles, 1992; Dutton, 1995). Furthermore, women may be more likely to report
abuse in a past marriage than abuse in a current marriage. It is also possible that non-
response to the survey as a whole may be correlated with abuse. We are not able to
directly address this issue. However, Statistics Canada, recognizing the sensitive nature
of the survey, consulted a wide range of experts while constructing the questionnaire to
mitigate the degree of non-response in the survey. Interviewers were trained to recognize and
respond to signals that the respondent was concerned about being overheard and telephone
numbers of local support services were oﬀered to women reporting current cases of abuse
and to women in distress (Statistics Canada, 1994b). In addition, sensitive questions on the
survey were prefaced with statements designed to make the respondent more comfortable
answering the question. As a result of these eﬀorts, it is likely that under-reporting of
domestic violence is diminished to a large extent.4
4A total of 19,309 eligible respondents were contacted, resulting in a response rate of 63.7% (Statistics
5Third, the data set contains detailed information about the frequency and severity
of abuse in current as well as past marriages, and personal background information on
respondents and their spouses, including violence in the family of origin.5 In this context,
violence in the family of origin refers to incidents of domestic abuse inﬂicted on the mother
by the father. The latter information is extremely important. As noted in the introduction,
domestic abuse is often treated as an exogenous determinant of outcomes, even though in
the same literature it also is recognized as the outcome of a household decision problem.
Information on family background aids us in studying the simultaneity of these outcomes
as it provides a source of exogenous variation in determining abuse. In addition to rich
information on domestic violence, the VAWS contains standard information on the personal
characteristics of women, including current employment status, education and the presence
of children.
To conduct our analysis, the following restrictions are placed on the sample. First, to
reduce the number of women currently receiving schooling and women not participating in
the labor force for retirement reasons, the age range of the sample is restricted to women
aged 25-55 who are not enrolled in school, eliminating 5620 women. Any married women
with more than two relationships (436) and any currently single women with more than
one relationship (276) are removed, for the data only contain information on the current
spouse and one past spouse. Any women reporting that they are currently married but not
living with their spouse (112) and widows (87) are eliminated from the sample. Finally,
all respondents with missing covariate information are eliminated (383). The sample size is
Canada, 1994a). In light of the relatively low response rate, we compared the VAWS with the Canadian
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The average characteristics of women are the same with the exception
of the proportion of women living in urban areas and in terms of educational attainments. See Appendix A
for further details.
5For the purpose of this paper, women are recorded as married if they report being married and living
with their spouse or if they report living common-law. The VAWS classiﬁes a relationship as common-law
if a woman was living with a man as husband and wife without being legally married (Statistics Canada,
1993b). Note that 8% of all currently married women are reported as living common-law.
6thus reduced to 5386 women, of which 5% remain single, 73% remain in their ﬁrst marriage,
9% are divorced and currently single and 13% are remarried. Below, we document several
empirical regularities regarding marriage, divorce and domestic violence that are found in
the data.
The average characteristics of abused women vary considerably from those of
non-abused women
A number of past studies on domestic violence have considered samples of currently
married and physically abused women. We present sample statistics for currently married
women in Table 1, where the sample is subdivided by the severity of abuse in the current
marriage. Women are recorded in the VAWS as experiencing low severity abuse if the
highest level of reported abuse involves threatening to hit, pushing, grabbing, shoving or
slapping; high severity abuse involves kicking, biting, beating, choking, threatening to use
or using a gun or knife, or sexual assault. Key characteristics of women diﬀer across levels
of abuse severity: women who experience high levels of abuse are less likely to possess post-
secondary and university education and are more likely to come from violent homes than
women reporting mild or no abuse.6 Abused women also marry earlier and are more likely
to have children than women who have not experienced violence in their current marriages.
Despite the diﬀerences among the samples, the labor force behavior of abused women is
quite similar to that of non-abused women in terms of weeks worked and participation
rates.
The average characteristics of violent husbands vary considerably from those of
non-violent husbands
The characteristics of abusive and non-abusive husbands in current marriages can also
be compared in Table 1. Abusive spouses are much more likely to have violent family
backgrounds. This ﬁnding is consistent with other studies: Strauss, Gelles and Steinmetz
6Fleming (1997) also reports that one-third of abused women witnessed domestic violence against their
mothers.
7(1980) report that men who witnessed their fathers abuse their mothers are three times
more likely to abuse their wives in a sample of American couples. Many women report they
did not know whether their husbands came from violent homes. Interestingly, spouses with
unknown family backgrounds are also more likely to be abusive. Abusive husbands are also
more likely to have experienced unemployment in the past twelve months and are less likely
to have a university education than non-abusive spouses.
Many abusive marriages end in divorce
The sample of currently married women may not be an appropriate sample of women to
consider when discussing domestic abuse, for women who suﬀered more severe abuse may
be more likely to divorce. Table 2 supports this claim, as divorce rates for women abused
in ﬁrst marriages are dramatically diﬀerent than those for non-abused women: while the
divorce rate for non-abused women is 15%, women who experienced high severity abuse
in a ﬁrst marriage have a divorce rate of 75%.7 This ﬁnding is surprising in light of the
psychology literature that contends abused women tend to be caught in a cycle of violence
and are unable or unwilling to leave abusive spouses. For example, Dutton (1995, p.167)
comments:
Casual discussion with police or other professionals typically generates an ac-
count of a woman who needed police intervention to save her life, who agreed
to charge her husband, and who was given shelter in a transition home. After
a few weeks, despite the support of transition house staﬀ and in the absence
of face-to-face contact with her husband, she decides abruptly to return to the
marriage and drop the charges. The state is left without its key witness if it pro-
ceeds to trial, the police mutter knowingly about ‘these women always dropping
the charges,’ and inexperienced transition-home workers wonder what they did
wrong.
The statistics in Table 2 likely diﬀer from past studies because of their use of non-random
samples. Many psychological studies utilize small samples of women in shelters or in counsel-
7Lloyd (1997b) also ﬁnds that women who experienced severe abuse are more likely to be divorced in her
data on low-income families.
8ing. Such samples underestimate divorce rates among abused women, as they likely exclude
many women who left relationships after learning of their spouse’s abusive behavior.
Table 3 presents additional evidence that abuse-related characteristics and the preva-
lence of abuse vary considerably across intact ﬁrst marriages and those that ended in divorce.
Divorced women, even those who remarry, are more likely to come from violent homes. In
addition, approximately one-half of past marriages are abusive while only 15% of current
marriages report abuse.
Abused women are less likely to work than non-abused women
Table 4 presents comparisons of current labor force behavior for abused and non-abused
women across diﬀerent marital histories. In general, abused women are less likely to par-
ticipate in the labor force or to choose full-year employment than women experiencing no
abuse, including women experiencing abuse in past relationships. Whether the diﬀerences
reported here are due to causal eﬀects of abuse on employment or due to diﬀerences in
characteristics determining who is abused and who works is a question we address in our
econometric speciﬁcation. Overall, the sample statistics suggest standard economic charac-
teristics of women and their spouses diﬀer across the abused and non-abused samples and
that domestic abuse may be an inﬂuential factor in both marital and employment choices.
3 Model
In this section, we present a model that describes the marriage, divorce, abuse and employ-
ment decisions of households and is designed to explain the empirical regularities outlined
above. Building on the work of Tauchen, Witte and Long (1991), our model explicitly con-
siders the husband’s decision to abuse his wife. It also incorporates important aspects of
the wife’s divorce and employment decisions within a multi-state, ﬁnite horizon framework.
The timing in the model is as follows. Women make decisions in every odd period and men
9make decisions in every even period. Individuals receive a constant level of utility for the
period in which they make decisions and for the subsequent period in which their spouses
make decisions. One full period for a couple therefore consists of one odd and one even
period. All agents are single in the ﬁrst period. Women move ﬁrst and decide whether to
work (h) or not (n) and whether to be married (m) or single (s). Denote the choice set for
women I = {sn,sh,mn,mh}. After observing their wife’s employment choice, the husband
decides whether to be abusive (a) or not (na) in the marriage.8 Denote the choice set for
husbands J = {a,na}.
Within the model, women get disutility from domestic violence and can respond to abuse
through their employment and marital status decisions. Abuse in the previous period may
directly inﬂuence a wife’s preferences for work in the current period. In addition, a wife may
respond to her husband’s decision to abuse her by divorcing him in the next period. Since
both partners are forward-looking, a husband must take into account his wife’s preference
over abuse and the possibility she will divorce him in the future when deciding whether to
abuse her today. This feature of the model allows us to capture the high divorce rate for
abusive marriages and any eﬀect of past abuse on current employment decisions for women.
We allow for several additional interactions between employment and domestic violence
within the model. As in Tauchen, Witte and Long (1991), the husband may receive utility
from abuse directly and may use abuse as a way to inﬂuence the behavior of his wife. Thus,
the wife takes into account the eﬀect of her current employment decision on the likelihood
her spouse is abusive in the next period. In particular, women abused by their partners
may be more or less likely to work in the next period to avoid future abuse in the marriage.
This feature of the model allows future domestic violence to play a role in the determination
of the wife’s current employment status and allows the employment decisions of wives to
8The employment decision of men is not incorporated in the model: data are only available on the
current employment decision of currently married spouses, which is not suﬃcient to estimate the male’s
joint decisions to abuse and work.
10inﬂuence the abuse decisions of husbands.
The model also allows men and women to assume several discrete exogenous types, l ∈ L
and k ∈ K, respectively. Each individual has type-speciﬁc preferences over his/her own be-
havior in the current period and over the decisions taken by their spouse in the previous
period. Individuals do not have preferences over their spouse’s type but know how types
are related to a husband’s propensity to abuse and a wife’s propensity to work and divorce.
Women thus use information on a potential spouse’s type, observed before marriage, when
deciding to match. Individual heterogeneity is introduced in the model to capture the dif-
ferences in characteristics of husbands and wives across abusive and non-abusive marriages
that are highlighted in Section 2. The introduction of individual heterogeneity also allows
us to assess whether the low employment rates of abused women can be attributed to di-
rect eﬀects of abuse on employment or to diﬀerent individual characteristics that jointly
determine who works and who marries an abusive spouse.
3.1 Women
Let V w
it (k|jt−1,l) denote the value function for a woman of type k taking decision i in period
t, married to a husband of type l who made decision j in period t − 1. The utility single
women receive each period depends on her type, the abuse decision of the ex-husband if
married in the previous period, and an idiosyncratic component of utility. A woman does
not experience abusive behavior before marriage. However, she does observe her spouse’s
exogenous type and takes into account the relationship between his type and his expected
future response to her actions when she is deciding whether to marry and work today. All
single women meet a potential spouse in every period. Women who do not have a current
spouse receive a spouse type valued zero, and women who do not have a previous spouse
receive jt−1 equal to zero. Denote γl the probability a single woman meets a potential
spouse of type l. After observing the potential spouse’s type, women decide whether to
11marry and to work in the future. The value function for a single woman of type k is:
V w













it ∈ {sn,sh}, where
P
l0∈L γl0 = 1 and β is the discount factor.
After the marriage is formed, men decide whether to abuse their wives. Past abuse
directly inﬂuences the utility women receive in the current period. The value function for
married women, i ∈ {mn,mh}, is:
V w















The expected value of future utility also depends on the realization of εw
it+2 and her hus-




jt(l|it−1,k) denote the value function for a husband of type l taking decision j in t,























j ∈ {na,a}. The expected value of future utility for the husband depends on the realization
of εh
jt+2 and the expected response of their wives in the next period, Υw
it+1(k|jt,l), including
the probability wives choose to divorce. The female’s tolerance of abuse and the ease with
which she can leave the marriage thus becomes a key issue in determining whether men
12decide to abuse their wives. Once divorced, it is assumed for simplicity that husbands can’t
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In period T, men no longer make decisions and receive no utility in the future. Since men






















if iT−1 ∈ {sn,sh}.
133.4 Optimal Policies
The solution to the model is based on a set of reservation values. The sequence of reservation
values that form the solution to the problems faced by husbands and wives can be expressed
in terms of the stochastic component of utility. For wives, deﬁne εw∗
it such that women prefer
to be married and not working for values of εw
mnt − εw
it above εw∗
it and would like to choose
state i for values of εw
mnt −εw
it below εw∗
it for every state i,i ∈ {sn,sh,mh}; εw∗
it is the value
such that
V w
it (k|jt−1,l) + εw
mnt − εw
it = V w
mnt(k|jt−1,l) + εw∗
it (11)
for it ∈ {sn,sh,mh}. Consider two possible states i,i0 ∈ It where It is the choice set
available in period t. Women will choose state i in t if the value of choosing i exceeds the













it , ∀i ∈ I
0 otherwise.
(13)
Similarly, for the abusive state, j = a, deﬁne εh∗
nat such that husbands prefer to be non-
abusive for values of εh
nat−εh
at above εh∗









at = V h
nat(l|it−1,k) + εh∗
nat (14)
for it−1 ∈ {mn,mh}. Men will choose to abuse their wives in t if the value of an abusive
marriage exceeds the value of a non-abusive marriage. The state yielding the highest level














The model presented above has the potential to account for several important relation-
ships between abuse, marital status and employment. First, the determinants of domestic
abuse are an integral component of the model and include the possibility that employment
decisions of women may inﬂuence the abuse propensity within marriage. If a husband has
preferences over the employment behavior of his wife, he may use abuse as a tool to inﬂuence
her choice in the next period. Second, the wife’s tolerance for abuse serves to inﬂuence the
abusive behavior of her husband: women who are less tolerant of abuse may be more likely
to divorce in response to domestic violence. Men take this into account when deciding to
abuse.
Although several important relationships are incorporated in the model, two caveats
should be raised before proceeding to estimation. First, the data contain only limited infor-
mation about the composition of the current household and it is not possible to determine
the timing of births. Due to the limitations imposed by the data and the complexity inher-
ent in modeling the timing and number of children, fertility decisions are not incorporated
in this paper. However, as in many other studies, the presence of children in the house-
hold is allowed to aﬀect the marriage and employment decisions of women. Second, the
dynamics of labor supply decisions have been found to be important in previous work (e.g.,
Eckstein and Wolpin, 1989; van der Klaauw, 1996), as well as the relationship between
current employment and future divorce (Johnson and Skinner, 1986). These relationships
are not addressed here as no information is available in the data on employment histories
and labor market experience. Both issues are worthy of further attention. However, given
the limitations of the data, they are beyond the scope of the current paper.
154 Econometric Speciﬁcation
The model outlined in Section 3 captures the sequential nature of marital status choices.
Information in the VAWS is available on the current employment status of women, abuse
in past and current marriages and whether the ﬁrst marriage ended in divorce. Therefore,
we estimate a four period version of the model outlined above. All women are initially
single and decide whether to marry and work in the ﬁrst period. After observing their
spouses’ abuse decisions in the second period, women decide whether to work and whether
to divorce in the third period. Men decide whether to abuse in the second and fourth
periods, conditional on the female’s employment status decisions. We, therefore, estimate
the transitions to marriage and divorce, the female’s employment status decision in the
third period and the husband’s decision to abuse his wife in the second and fourth periods.
The model is solved by backwards recursion, as discussed in the previous section, and the
solution to the model is used to construct the likelihood function.
Retrospective data on the transition to marriage and on the presence of abuse prior
to the past twelve months is used to estimate the female’s decision in period 1 and the
husband’s decision to abuse in period 2, respectively. Retrospective data on the transition
from marriage to divorce and the woman’s decision to work in the past twelve months is
used to estimate her decision in period 3. Data on the decisions of men to abuse in the past
twelve months is used to estimate the husband’s decision in period 4. The ﬁrst two periods
therefore capture all the decisions made prior to the last twelve months, with the exception
of the decision to divorce. The last two periods capture the divorce decision and all decisions
made within the last twelve months. Information on the presence of abuse in the family of
origin for men and women provides important exogenous variation that is used to identify
the husbands’s propensity to abuse and the wife’s marriage and employment decisions.
164.1 Speciﬁcation for Husbands
As mentioned above, husbands decide whether to abuse in the second and fourth periods.
Data on the severity and frequency of abuse in current and previous marriages are available
in the VAWS. For the purposes of our analysis, abuse is deﬁned as an indicator equal to one
if the husband inﬂicted high severity abuse on his wife. This deﬁnition of abuse is adopted
for two reasons. First, the data on abuse severity are richer than that on abuse frequency.
Abuse severity is split into categories based on speciﬁc activities, while the frequency data
are categorical in nature and top-coded at 11, limiting their accuracy and usefulness in
estimation. Second, in constrast to high severity abuse, a preliminary analysis of the raw
data indicated that frequent, low-severity abuse was not highly correlated with divorce and
employment. Information is also available on whether any of the abuse experienced in the
current marriage occurred within the past twelve months. Unfortunately, this information
does not distinguish between high severity and low severity abuse. We, therefore, deﬁne
current period abuse as an indicator equal to one for women reporting high severity abuse
in the current marriage and abuse within the last twelve months, zero otherwise.
A limited set of characteristics is available on husbands in ﬁrst marriages in the data. In
particular, for women who are currently divorced, the data only contain information on the
presence of abuse and information regarding the presence of domestic violence in her spouse’s
family of origin, a strong predictor of abuse in previous studies. Some women reported
that they did not possess information on their spouse’s family background.9 Instead of
excluding these couples, we allow men to come in two exogenous types, non-violent family
background and violent family background, and infer the true type for men with unknown
family backgrounds. In particular for women who report family background is unknown,
we assume they observe other characteristics of their spouses, such as whether the family
9383 women reported they did not know whether their ﬁrst spouse witnessed violence in his family of
origin.
17of origin is dysfunctional in other respects, that are perfectly correlated with their spouses
family background and inﬂuence their husbands’ propensity to be abusive in the same
manner as the family background measure in the data. For the purposes of estimation, this
assumption implies that the woman observes her spouse’s type, while the econometrician
does not in the absence of information on family background.
Preferences for men taking decision j of type l, married to women taking decision i in
t − 1, are therefore speciﬁed as:
αh
jl + θh
j it−1 + εh
jt (17)
for j ∈ {na,a} and t ∈ {2,4}. The utility from divorce and no abuse are normalized to zero
for identiﬁcation purposes.
4.2 Speciﬁcation for Wives
A richer set of information is available for female respondents in the data set and is included
in estimation. Current employment information is available where working is deﬁned by
an indicator equal to one if women reported working 52 weeks in the past year and zero
otherwise. Information on the age, education, province of residence, the presence of children
in the household and the family background of women are also available. This information
is used to deﬁne the exogenous types of women in the marriage market. While most of
these characteristics are time invariant, some are likely to change over time. Unfortunately,
due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, we do not observe time variation in the data
used to construct types. Implicitly, we are therefore assuming that a woman carries her
observed type at the time of the survey throughout the decision process of the model, i.e.
both forward and backward in time.
Preferences for marriage and employment vary with each of the aforementioned char-
acteristics for women. The utility women receive from abuse also varies depending on her
18marital status but, with the exception of family background, does not vary with exogenous
characteristics. Since we don’t have information on age at divorce, we allow divorced women
to have diﬀerent preferences than single women to capture age eﬀects. Denote the divorced,
not working and divorced, working states as dn and dh, respectively. Preferences for wives
of type k taking decision i, married to a spouse taking decision j in the previous period,
are therefore speciﬁed as:
αw
i k + θw
i jt−1 + εw
it (18)
for i ∈ {sn,sh,mh,dn,dh} and t ∈ {1,3} where jt−1 is zero if women were single in the
previous period. The utility from the married, not working state is normalized to zero.
4.3 Estimation of the Choice Probabilities
The choice probabilities are estimated according to the optimal policies described by (13)
and (16). Assume the idiosyncratic component of preferences is distributed i.i.d. extreme
value. The probability that a man of type l chooses alternative j in the fourth period is:









The probability that a man of type l chooses alternative j in the second period is:
Pr(j2 = 1|l,i1,k) =
exp{αh
jl + θh


























The probability that a wife of type k chooses alternative i in period 1 is
Pr(i1 = 1|k) =
exp{αw




r k + βE maxV w
r3(k|j2,l)}
, (22)
19and the probability that a wife of type k chooses alternative i in period 3 is
Pr(i3 = 1|k,j2,l) =
exp{αw
i k + θw




r k + θw
r j2 + βuw
r3(k|j4,l)}
. (23)
We must account for four features of the data when constructing the likelihood function.
First, the data do not contain information on the past employment decisions of women.
We, therefore, integrate over the female’s ﬁrst employment decision when estimating the
probability of experiencing abuse in the second period. Deﬁne dm as an indicator equal to
one if a woman in the sample reports a relationship, zero otherwise. The probability men







where Θ is the vector of preference parameters from the model. Second, we do not observe
the proportion of potential spouses that come from violent homes in the population. We
assume that men are equally likely to come from a violent home as women. The proportion
of all women in the sample from violent homes is 17.48%. The probability that women
decide to marry and work in the ﬁrst period is therefore:
Pr(i1|k,Θ) = 0.8252 · Pr(i1|j1,k,0,Θ) + 0.1748 · Pr(i1|j1,k,1,Θ). (25)
Third, as mentioned above, we assume that the wife, but not the econometrician, observes
spousal type for families when the wife reports she does not know whether her spouse has a
violent family background. We, therefore, estimate the probability spouses with unknown
family backgrounds are from violent homes (γb). Married women report the background of
their spouses with probability pk and don’t report with probability pu, where pk + pu = 1.
Deﬁne lu as an indicator equal to one if women report they don’t know their spouse’s
family background. Deﬁne lb to be an indicator equal to one if the husband comes from a













We set pu = 0.08215, the fraction of women who report the family background of their
spouse as unknown. We estimate diﬀerent spousal type probabilities for women who remain
married, women who divorce and remain single and women who divorce and eventually
remarry. Finally, for women that have been married less than twelve months, the likelihood
contribution is limited to the ﬁrst and second periods of marriage.















Estimates of the preference parameters for the model are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for
women and men, respectively. In this instance, the model is estimated with the discount
factor ﬁxed at 0.95.10 First, we examine the relationship between domestic abuse and di-
vorce. As expected, the estimated eﬀect of abuse on preferences for marriage is negative
and signiﬁcant. As can be seen in the ﬁrst row of Columns 4 and 5, domestic violence is
among the strongest determining factors of divorce decisions: women with abusive spouses
are signiﬁcantly more likely to divorce than to remain married. From the parameter es-
timates, we can compute the diﬀerence between divorce probabilities when women are in
non-violent versus violent marriages and ﬁnd that women who are abused are 76% more
10As reported by others, for example van der Klaauw (1996), diﬃculties were encountered when attempting
to estimate the discount factor. A myopic version of the model, with the discount factor ﬁxed at zero, was
also estimated. Results are available from the authors upon request.
21likely to divorce than women in non-abusive marriages. This result suggests that women
are responsive to the presence of domestic violence, a ﬁnding contrary to the common per-
ception that abused women have great diﬃculty leaving bad relationships. Interestingly,
domestic violence does not appear to have a direct eﬀect on preferences over work, as the
results indicate domestic violence does not have a signiﬁcant impact on a married woman’s
decision to work. These results suggest that women’s tolerance of abuse appears to only tell
part of the story, as the preference parameters alone cannot explain the majority of the dif-
ference in divorce rates and employment rates across abused and non-abused women in the
data. In particular, the stylized facts presented in Section 2 indicate that the divorce rate
for women experiencing high severity abuse is over four times higher than that for women
in non-abusive marriages. Diﬀerences in exogenous individual characteristics thus play an
important role in determining who is abused and who is likely to work and to divorce. We
discuss this issue in detail below.
The presence of violence in a woman’s family of origin does not appear to signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence the initial decision to marry nor the employment decision of married women.
However, a violent family background does have implications for divorce decisions that
diﬀer depending on whether the woman’s own marriage was abusive. In particular, women
from violent homes are more likely to divorce but are also more likely to tolerate abuse.
It therefore appears that the correlation between family backgrounds of women and their
spouses observed in the data is due to the fact that once married, men may be more
likely to abuse because their wife is less likely to leave if she is from a violent home. The
estimated probabilities presented at the bottom of Table 5 indicate that most married
women reporting they don’t know their spouse’s family background behave as if he had a
non-violent background and most divorced, including those who eventually remarry, women
behave as if their former spouse had a violent background.11
11We note that this result implies that the initial distribution of violent backgrounds for men is such that
22The preference parameters for husbands are presented in Table 6. We allow the abuse
intercepts to diﬀer across the second and fourth periods to allow the accumulation of marital-
speciﬁc capital to inﬂuence the husband’s preferences over abuse. The intercepts for both
periods suggest that men get disutility from abusing their wives overall. However, observing
violence as a child signiﬁcantly increases the likelihood of abusing one’s wife, as illustrated
in Row 4 of Table 6. Computing the diﬀerence between abuse propensities for men from
abusive homes and for those from non-abusive homes, we ﬁnd that men with violent family
backgrounds are 348% more likely to abuse their wives. This result suggests that witnessing
violence as a child may reduce the disutility of domestic violence substantially and conﬁrms
the importance of the inter-generational impacts of domestic violence. Previous abuse in
the second period is also a good predictor of violence in the current period, as men who
abused their wives in the past and are still married are signiﬁcantly more likely to abuse
their wives in the current period than men who were not abusive in the past. The results
also suggest that marriage to a working wife reduces the likelihood of abuse, although the
eﬀects are not signiﬁcant. The diﬀerences in employment rates of abused women that are
present in the raw data can therefore not be attributed to a direct causal eﬀect of domestic
violence on employment.
As an illustration of the importance of diﬀerences in exogenous characteristics across
abusive and non-abusive couples, we consider the predicted behavior of four hypothetical
couples in Table 7. All couples are from Ontario with a wife that is 38 years of age. In
couple A, both partners come from non-violent homes, the wife has at least a post-secondary
education, and the couple has no children. In this instance, the predicted marriage rate
is relatively low, in part due to the high value of the female’s time in the labor market.
The overall abuse rate in ﬁrst marriages is low, and those marriages that do become violent
14.43% of men came from violent homes, which is close to the corresponding 17.46% for women in the initial
family background distribution. Calculations are available from the authors upon request.
23are very likely to end in divorce, as women have favorable outside options in the event the
marriage dissolves. For couple B, we assume both partners come from violent homes, but
hold all other characteristics the same as for couple A. Changing the family background
characteristics in this manner results in a large rise in marriage rates, associated with a rise
in divorce rates. This shift in behavior is likely due to the fact that women from violent
homes are more tolerant of abuse (hence more willing to face the prospect of entering an
abusive marriage) but also more likely to divorce. As expected, we observe a dramatic
increase in abuse rates for couples with violent family backgrounds. One striking result for
couple B, as compared to couple A, is that women in abusive marriages are less likely to
work in the current period.
We next consider changing the wife’s education level from post-secondary in couple B
to less than high school to generate the predictions in Column C. The results suggest that
women with lower levels of education are less likely to divorce. This ﬁnding is likely due to
the limited outside labor market opportunities faced by uneducated women, and is conﬁrmed
in part by the low employment rates in Rows 5-9. As women ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to leave
abusive marriages, husbands are more likely to abuse their wives, especially women who
were not working in the previous period. Education therefore seems to play an important
role in determining which women are abused and which women are able to leave abusive
relationships. Column D presents predictions for couples with children that are the same
in all other respects to the couples in Column C. As is consistent with the literature, the
couples with children have much lower divorce rates than childless couples and women with
children have lower employment rates. Interestingly, couples with children are also more
likely to be abusive. Women with children prefer to remain married than to divorce; men
therefore face a lower chance of separation following abuse and are more likely to abuse as
a result.
24The predictions in Table 7 help to provide a picture of how diﬀerences in exogenous
characteristics relate to the diﬀerences highlighted in the raw data. In summary, it appears
that the high divorce rates and the low employment rates of abused married women are
driven by diﬀerences in characteristics that help determine a woman’s opportunities outside
the marriage. In particular, well-educated women and women without children are more
likely to work and are more likely to divorce, suggesting that the characteristics driving the
employment decision are also important in determining who stays with an abusive spouse.
Men do face a deterrent eﬀect, as men are less likely to abuse wives that have better outside
opportunities. Both results are consistent with the burgeoning literature that examines
the positive link between current employment and future divorce decisions (Johnson and
Skinner, 1986; van der Klaauw, 1996). However, the presence of a violent family background
is by far the most important determinant of abuse.
Table 8 provides evidence on the predictive performance of the model. Considering
the limitations of the data, the model is able to match the dynamics of marital status
decisions well. In particular, the econometric speciﬁcation matches the high divorce rates
for abusive marriages and relatively low divorce rates for non-violent relationships. The
model does over-predict the number of marriages formed in the data. This is not surprising
given the fact that we must integrate out both the female’s initial employment decision
and the initial distribution of family background information of husbands. The predicted
employment rates are slightly higher than those in the data; however we are able to match
the employment rates in the data reasonably well overall. In general, the model is also
able to match the statistics on the prevalence of domestic violence, including abuse rates
in past marriages and the low current abuse rates in intact marriages. These results are
quite encouraging, considering the fact that the model was estimated with limited spousal
information.
255.2 Policy Experiments
A major advantage of constructing and estimating a behavioral model of domestic violence,
employment and divorce is that we can consider a variety of policy experiments aimed at
reducing domestic violence. Several policy initiatives already exist in many countries that
are designed to help women leave abusive marriages. Shelters, counseling services and abuse
telephone hot-lines, for example, are oﬀered extensively as a means of lowering the costs to
women of leaving abusive relationships. Other strategies, such as tougher laws prohibiting
domestic violence and mandatory programs designed to re-socialize abusive spouses have
been adopted to increase the costs of domestic violence to abusers. There has also been
much discussion of the inter-generational eﬀects of domestic violence and how policy might
address this issue. In this section, we describe how one can translate such policies into the
parameters of our framework, and then assess the behavioral implications of four policy
experiments that address the aforementioned issues.
The ﬁrst two experiments consider policies adopted widely in practice. As mentioned
above, several policies, such as providing shelters and counseling and legal services to abused
women, have been aimed at reducing the costs of leaving violent marriages. This type of
policy is examined in our model by increasing the female’s preference for divorce if abused
by 50%. The results of this experiment are reported in Table 9. They suggest that such
a policy would increase the number of divorces but would not reduce the prevalence of
domestic violence in ﬁrst marriage. Reducing the tolerance for abuse results in a 23%
increase in divorce rates in abusive marriages. While the prevalence of violence in ﬁrst
marriages does not decline, the fraction of currently abused women does fall by 60%. In
other words, the overall abuse rate remains the same but the number of incidents of abuse
suﬀered falls. Women who remain in abusive marriages after the policy change have lower
employment rates. This is likely a compositional eﬀect of the policy change: those women
26who remain married are those who are less likely to work, as conﬁrmed by the results in
Table 7.
The second experiment we consider is one designed to directly increase the costs of
violence to abusive spouses. Such policies could include longer prison sentences for domestic
violence or mandatory counseling programs for abusive men, and are most likely to inﬂuence
men whose wives have left the marriage and have ﬁled formal charges against them. We
therefore conduct this policy within the model by implementing a 1 util divorce cost for
abusive men in Table 10, which is approximately one-half the size of the second period
intercept for husbands. While the fraction of women that initially marry does not change,
this policy change serves as a substantial deterrent to abuse: the overall abuse rate in
ﬁrst marriages falls by 35%. Current abuse rates also fall after the policy change. As
consistent with the ﬁrst experiment, increasing the cost of abuse has virtually no impact on
the employment rates of currently married women. This ﬁnding is not surprising given the
ﬁndings that the negative correlation in the data between female employment and domestic
violence is largely compositional in nature.
The ﬁnal two experiments we consider are those designed to reduce the intergenerational
eﬀects of domestic violence. Such policies might be implemented in practice, for example, by
re-socializing children from abusive homes through counseling or mentoring programs. We
implement the policy in the model by setting the family background preference parameters
to zero. Results of these experiments are presented in Tables 11 and 12 for women and men,
respectively. Eliminating the eﬀect of a violent family background on women’s marriage,
divorce and employment choices has virtually no impact on behavior. Women are equally
likely to marry, divorce, and work as in the baseline scenario. Preventing future domestic
violence by re-socializing women does not appear to be an eﬀective strategy for combating
domestic violence. In contrast, as illustrated in Table 12, men are quite responsive to the
27policy change. After re-socializing men from violent homes so that their preferences over
abuse are the same as those for men from non-violent homes, abuse rates in ﬁrst marriages
fall by 37% and abuse rates in current marriages fall by 85% as men from violent homes are
no more likely to abuse than men with violent backgrounds. The policy change has virtually
no impact on marriage rates, which is not surprising considering the high marriage rates
in the baseline speciﬁcation and the age range of the women in the sample. Although the
aggregate divorce rate falls due to the fall in the number of abusive spouses, the divorce
rate in abusive marriages also rises due to the fact that women are less tolerant of any abuse
that does occur.
6 Conclusion
The relationship between domestic abuse, employment and divorce is estimated in this
paper. The dominant eﬀect of abuse on women’s behavior is through divorce. The evi-
dence presented on the importance of abuse in the divorce decision highlights the fact that
many women observed in representative data respond to domestic violence by leaving the
relationship. This ﬁnding is in stark contrast to the common portrayal of abused women
as unable or unwilling to leave violent relationships. The results also conﬁrm the strong
inter-generational eﬀects of domestic violence, as observing domestic violence as a child
dramatically increases the likelihood of abusing one’s wife. As highlighted by the stylized
facts and the estimation results, much of the diﬀerence in employment, marital and abusive
behavior is driven by the fact that abusive couples tend to have characteristics, such as vi-
olent family backgrounds and lower levels of education, that diﬀer substantially from those
in non-violent marriages. Together, the ﬁndings suggest that policies aimed at addressing
domestic violence should not ignore the important links between abuse, marriage and em-
ployment. If the costs of program implementation across men and women are the same,
28our policy experiments suggest targeting the behavior of men is a more eﬀective means of
reducing or preventing domestic violence; abused women are less responsive to reductions
in the cost of leaving abusive marriages and to eliminating the eﬀect of violent family back-
grounds on preferences. In contrast, increasing the costs of domestic abuse to husbands and
reducing the inter-generational eﬀects of violence for men appear to be promising strategies
for preventing abuse.
29Table 1: Sample Statistics for Currently Married Sample, by Abuse Severity
Variable No Abuse Low Severity Abuse High Severity Abuse
Participation rate 0.7992 0.8147 0.8450
(0.4006) (0.3890) (0.3632)
Worked 52 weeks 0.5688 0.5942 0.6154
(0.4953) (0.4916) (0.4882)
Age 38.4684 38.1635 38.8003
(8.2627) (8.0711) (8.0476)
Age at ﬁrst 22.5514 21.8855 21.2738
marriage (4.0292) (3.5998) (3.8753)
Child 0.7459 0.8339 0.8150
(0.4354) (0.3726) (0.3897)
High school 0.3172 0.3405 0.3442
(0.4654) (0.4744) (0.4769)
Post-secondary or 0.4914 0.4913 0.3480
university (0.5000) (0.5005) (0.4781)
Violence in family 0.1397 0.2454 0.3376
background (0.3467) (0.4308) (0.4747)
Violence in current 0.0778 0.2060 0.3735
spouse’s family (0.2679) (0.4049) (0.4855)
Don’t know current spouse’s 0.0576 0.0764 0.1057
family background (0.2330) (0.2659) (0.3087)
Spouse was unemployed 0.1238 0.1481 0.2422
(0.3294) (0.3556) (0.4300)
Spouse worked 52 weeks 0.7645 0.7522 0.6663
(0.4243) (0.4323) (0.4733)
Spouse has high school 0.2659 0.3077 0.3022
(0.4419) (0.4621) (0.4609)
Spouse has post-secondary 0.2631 0.2763 0.2847
(0.4404) (0.4470) (0.4529)
Spouse has university 0.2072 0.1641 0.0778
(0.4053) (0.3708) (0.2689)
Observations 3326 427 136
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
30Table 2: Divorce Rates by Abuse in First Marriage
No Abuse Low Severity Abuse High Severity Abuse
0.1437 0.2963 0.7397
(0.3509) (0.4570) (0.4392)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
31Table 3: Abuse-Related Characteristics by Marital History
Variable Single Married Divorced Remarried
and Single
Violence in family 0.1288 0.1588 0.2472 0.2225
background (0.3356) (0.3655) (0.4318) (0.4162)
Violence in current 0.1030 0.0976
spouse’s family (0.3041) (0.2970)
Don’t know current spouse’s 0.0615 0.0661
family background (0.2403) (0.2486)
Violence in past spouse’s 0.1775 0.1982
family background (0.3825) (0.3989)
Don’t know past spouse’s 0.1137 0.1106
family background (0.3178) (0.3138)
Low severity abuse in 0.1109 0.1193
current marriage (0.3140) (0.3244)
High severity abuse in 0.0374 0.0505
current marriage (0.1897) (0.2188)
Low severity abuse in 0.1649 0.1532
past marriage (0.3715) (0.3604)
High severity abuse in 0.3391 0.3716
past marriage (0.4739) (0.4835)
Observations 290 3889 467 740
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
32Table 4: Within History Comparisons of Labor Market Indicators
by Abuse Severity
Marital State Participation Rate Worked 52 Weeks
Married
No abuse 0.7992 0.5688
(0.4007) (0.4953)
Low severity 0.8147 0.5942
(0.3890) (0.4916)
High severity 0.8450 0.6154
(0.3632) (0.4883)
Divorced
No abuse 0.8002 0.5892
(0.4007) (0.4930)
Low severity 0.9053 0.6596
(0.2950) (0.4773)




No abuse 0.8449 0.6240
(0.3623) (0.4848)
Low severity 0.8182 0.6223
(0.3879) (0.4876)
High severity 0.9342 0.7129
(0.2516) (0.4590)
Previous marriage
No abuse 0.8789 0.6891
(0.3267) (0.4635)
Low severity 0.8172 0.6053
(0.3882) (0.4909)
High severity 0.8164 0.5601
(0.3879) (0.4973)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
33Table 5: Preference Parameters for Wives
Single Single Married Divorced Divorced
Not Working Working Working Not Working Working
Abusive spouse 0.2346 3.0010 3.2550
(0.1518) (0.1755) (0.1826)
Abusive spouse, wife -0.2991 -0.6527 -0.7195
has violent background (0.1810) (0.1821) (0.1666)
Wife has violent 0.04388 -0.0496 -0.0376 0.1030 0.2443
background (0.0725) (0.0666) (0.0697) (0.0848) (0.0654)
Child -1.0750 -1.7770 -0.3039 -0.8100 -1.1900
(0.1480) (0.1212) (0.0772) (0.0852) (0.0784)
High school 0.2456 0.5746 0.6926 0.1090 0.7596
(0.0757) (0.0938) (0.0730) (0.0832) (0.1121)
Post secondary 0.4827 0.8642 0.9241 -0.0760 1.1360
(0.0730) (0.0918) (0.0813) (0.0971) (0.1091)
Age/10 0.6204 1.9150 0.7772 1.1230 2.9800
(0.2228) (0.2698) (0.3463) (0.4199) (0.3268)
Age2/100 -0.1055 -0.2800 -0.1019 -0.1749 -0.4010
(0.0295) (0.0344) (0.0437) (0.0531) (0.0416)
Maritime -0.3718 -0.2420 -0.2749 -0.0835 -0.6728
(0.1016) (0.0950) (0.1083) (0.1148) (0.1120)
Quebec -0.2780 -0.1617 -0.1540 0.0890 -0.1840
(0.0863) (0.0909) (0.0969) (0.1022) (0.0973)
Ontario -0.0836 0.1481 0.2806 0.0556 -0.1390
(0.1013) (0.0813) (0.0932) (0.1008) (0.0956)
Prairie -0.2264 0.0741 0.2415 -0.0115 -0.1486
(0.0984) (0.0866) (0.0998) (0.1098) (0.1050)
Intercept -1.0110 -3.0510 -1.5750 -1.1880 -4.9880
(0.4005) (0.5081) (0.6530) (0.7723) (0.6274)





Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Married, not working is the base category.
34Table 6: Preference Parameters for Husbands
2nd period intercept -2.2630
(0.1612)
4th period intercept -13.7500
(0.2437)
Abusive in second period 10.7400
(0.2879)




Wife working, husband -0.3656
has violent background (0.4061)
Log-likelihood value -11744.3676
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Not abusive is the base category.
35Table 7: Comparison of Couples with Diﬀering Characteristics
A B C D
Marriage Rate
Overall 0.8119 0.9250 0.9395 0.9985
Divorce Rates
Overall 0.4171 0.5932 0.5335 0.3210
Abusive marriages 0.9225 0.8877 0.8303 0.6140
Non-abusive marriages 0.3812 0.4683 0.3848 0.1670
Employment Rates
Currently married women in abusive marriages 0.7860 0.6740 0.4532 0.3900
Currently married women in non-abusive marriages 0.7526 0.7456 0.5377 0.4618
Divorced women from abusive marriages 0.9025 0.9194 0.5176 0.3385
Divorced women from non-abusive marriages 0.8778 0.9044 0.4709 0.2980
Never-married women 0.8691 0.8470 0.7245 0.4012
Abuse Rates
Abuse rate in ﬁrst marriages 0.0663 0.2978 0.3338 0.3446
Current period abuse overall 0.0003 0.0155 0.0266 0.0447
Current period abuse, employed wife 0.0003 0.0107 0.0149 0.0243
Current period abuse, non-employed wife 0.0004 0.0291 0.0398 0.0613






Abusive marriages 0.7595 0.7352
Non-abusive marriages 0.1847 0.1927
Employment Rates
Currently married women in abusive marriages 0.5486 0.5708
Currently married women in non-abusive marriages 0.5832 0.5858
Divorced women from abusive marriages 0.5991 0.6300
Divorced women from non-abusive marriages 0.6166 0.6207
Never-married women 0.7877 0.7914
Abuse Rates
Abuse rate in ﬁrst marriages 0.1046 0.1137
Current period abuse overall 0.0060 0.0052
Current period abuse, employed wife 0.0057 0.0034
Current period abuse, non-employed wife 0.0065 0.0076
37Table 9: Experiment 1: Reduce Wife’s Tolerance for Abuse by 50%





Abusive marriages 0.7352 0.9060
Non-abusive marriages 0.1927 0.1968
Employment Rates
Currently married women in abusive marriages 0.5708 0.5516
Currently married women in non-abusive marriages 0.5858 0.5859
Divorced women from abusive marriages 0.6300 0.6554
Divorced women from non-abusive marriages 0.6207 0.6327
Never-married women 0.7914 0.7915
Abuse Rates
Abuse rate in ﬁrst marriages 0.1137 0.1125
Current period abuse overall 0.0052 0.0021
Current period abuse, employed wife 0.0034 0.0013
Current period abuse, non-employed wife 0.0076 0.0032
38Table 10: Experiment 2: Introduce a 1 Util Divorce Cost for Abusive Men





Abusive marriages 0.7352 0.7303
Non-abusive marriages 0.1927 0.1922
Employment Rates
Currently married women in abusive marriages 0.5708 0.5663
Currently married women in non-abusive marriages 0.5858 0.5855
Divorced women from abusive marriages 0.6300 0.6282
Divorced women from non-abusive marriages 0.6207 0.6198
Never-married women 0.7914 0.7914
Abuse Rates
Abuse rate in ﬁrst marriages 0.1137 0.0737
Current period abuse overall 0.0052 0.0035
Current period abuse, employed wife 0.0034 0.0023
Current period abuse, non-employed wife 0.0076 0.0052
39Table 11: Experiment 3: Eliminate the Eﬀect of Family Background on
Wife’s Preferences over Marriage and Employment





Abusive marriages 0.7352 0.7398
Non-abusive marriages 0.1927 0.1838
Employment Rates
Currently married women in abusive marriages 0.5708 0.5849
Currently married women in non-abusive marriages 0.5858 0.5873
Divorced women from abusive marriages 0.6300 0.6219
Divorced women from non-abusive marriages 0.6207 0.6092
Never-married women 0.7914 0.7959
Abuse Rates
Abuse rate in ﬁrst marriages 0.1137 0.1135
Current period abuse overall 0.0052 0.0050
Current period abuse, employed wife 0.0034 0.0034
Current period abuse, non-employed wife 0.0076 0.0073
40Table 12: Experiment 4: Eliminate the Eﬀect of Family Background on
Husband’s Predilection for Abuse





Abusive marriages 0.7352 0.7647
Non-abusive marriages 0.1927 0.1923
Employment Rates
Currently married women in abusive marriages 0.5708 0.6028
Currently married women in non-abusive marriages 0.5858 0.5854
Divorced women from abusive marriages 0.6300 0.6271
Divorced women from non-abusive marriages 0.6207 0.6198
Never-married women 0.7914 0.7913
Abuse Rates
Abuse rate in ﬁrst marriages 0.1137 0.07125
Current period abuse overall 0.0052 0.0008
Current period abuse, employed wife 0.0034 0.0006
Current period abuse, non-employed wife 0.0076 0.0010
41A Comparison of Average Characteristics for the Violence
Against Women and 1993 Survey of Consumer Finances
Samples
Table A1 compares similar samples from the VAWS and the 1993 SCF, a supplement of the
Canadian Labor Force Survey similar to the March Current Population Survey in the U.S.,
to assess the representativeness of the former data set. Both samples are limited to women
between the ages of 25 and 55 who are not attending school. The average characteristics of
women in the VAWS and SCF data are similar, with three exceptions. First, total spousal
income is higher in the SCF. It is likely that the measure of spousal income reported from
the VAWS is inaccurate, as spousal income was constructed as the diﬀerence between the
categorical variables“Total Personal Income” and “Total Household Income”. Second, the
proportion of women residing in an urban area is higher in the SCF. It should be noted
that P.E.I. was not assigned a “Rural/Urban” indicator in the VAWS, and was thus coded
as “Rural”. Finally, the proportion of women with some post-secondary education is higher
in the SCF and the proportions of women with high school and university degrees is lower.
This latter diﬀerence could stem from coding or non-response pattern diﬀerences across the
data sets. However, given the many similarities between the VAWS and the SCF especially
in terms of employment patterns,12 it does not appear the high non-response rate for the
VAWS resulted in an unrepresentative sample.
12In the VAW, full-time employment applies to respondents reporting full-time work in the past year; in
the SCF full-time employment applies to those reporting ‘mostly’ working full-time in the reference year.
42Table A1 Comparison of Average Characteristics for the Violence Against Women
and Survey of Consumer Finances (1993) Samples
Variable SCF93 (1992 Income) VAW (1993)
Total personal income 20,448.48 21,933.72
(130.0261) (214.0748)
Total spousal income 39,439.08 30,404.59
(286.5227) (257.1105)
Age of respondent 38.6668 38.9941
(0.0582) (0.1038)
Respondent resides in Nﬂd., N.S., 0.0819 0.0859
N.B. or P.E.I. (0.0019) (0.0034)
Respondent resides in Quebec 0.2555 0.2694
(0.0030) (0.0054)
Respondent resides in Ontario 0.3793 0.3624
(0.0034) (0.0059)
Respondent resides in AB., SK., 0.1575 0.1657
or MN. (0.0025) (0.0045)
Respondent resides in B.C. 0.1191 0.1165
(0.0022) (0.0039)
Respondent resides in an urban area3 0.8260 0.7456
(0.0026) (0.0053)
Highest level of education is less 0.2311 0.2071
than high school (0.0029) (0.0050)
Highest level of education is 0.2632 0.3197
high school (0.0030) (0.0057)
Highest level of education includes 0.3571 0.2964
some post-secondary education (0.0033) (0.0056)
Highest level of education is a 0.1486 0.1767
university degree (0.0025) (0.0047)
Respondent worked in the reference year 0.7882 0.7685
(0.0028) (0.0052)
Respondent worked or looked for work 0.8129 0.8165
in the reference year (0.0027) (0.0047)
Number of weeks worked for respondents 0.8767 0.8906
who reported working (0.0020) (0.0033)
Respondent worked full-time4 0.7652 0.7365
(0.0036) (0.0061)
Respondent worked part-time 0.2212 0.2635
(0.0035) (0.0061)
Note: standard errors in parentheses.
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